Do children go for the nice guys? The influence of speaker benevolence and certainty on selective word learning by Bergstra, M. et al.
ARTICLE
Do children go for the nice guys? The influence of
speaker benevolence and certainty on selective
word learning
Myrthe BERGSTRA1*, Hannah N. M. DE MULDER2**, and Peter COOPMANS3
1UiL OTS, Utrecht University, the Netherlands, 2LUCL, Leiden University, the Netherlands, and 3UiL OTS,
Utrecht University, the Netherlands
*Corresponding author. Trans 10, 3512 JK Utrecht, The Netherlands. E-mail: M.Bergstra@uu.nl
**Bergstra and De Mulder share first authorship of this paper.
(Received 31 August 2016; revised 2 June 2017; accepted 19 October 2017;
first published online 6 April 2018)
Abstract
This study investigated how speaker certainty (a rational cue) and speaker benevolence (an
emotional cue) influence children’s willingness to learn words in a selective learning
paradigm. In two experiments four- to six-year-olds learnt novel labels from two speakers
and, after a week, their memory for these labels was reassessed. Results demonstrated that
children retained the label–object pairings for at least a week. Furthermore, children preferred
to learn from certain over uncertain speakers, but they had no significant preference for nice
over nasty speakers. When the cues were combined, children followed certain speakers, even
if they were nasty. However, children did prefer to learn from nice and certain speakers over
nasty and certain speakers. These results suggest that rational cues regarding a speaker’s
linguistic competence trump emotional cues regarding a speaker’s affective status in word
learning. However, emotional cues were found to have a subtle influence on this process.
Keywords: word learning; speaker benevolence; speaker certainty
Introduction
In acquiring the vocabulary of a language, the child has to learn from other people which
label to use to accurately refer to things in the world. Children are generally quite
prepared to learn from the testimony of others, but they do not gullibly accept
everything that comes their way (see, for example, Harris & Koenig, 2006, and
Markson & Bloom, 1997, for relevant studies, and Gelman, 2009, for a review of this
topic). Previous research has demonstrated that children can be quite selective in their
learning, evaluating not only the nature of the information that speakers provide them
with, but also the general characteristics of the speaker providing the information
(Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013). If children are given cues that suggest that one speaker is
more reliable than another, they prefer to learn from the more reliable speaker. This
type of learning via social transmission has been argued to be a rational process (Sobel
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& Kushnir, 2013). That is, children take their previous knowledge into account, not only
regarding the objects of learning, but also with respect to what they know about the
particular speakers they are dealing with. However, Mills (2013) argues that although
children can be critical in evaluating information in many respects, their critical
thinking must not be overestimated. That is, children may be capable of recognising
certain signals of untrustworthiness, without necessarily understanding that there may
be a weighting in the importance of these different signals.
Rational and emotional cues in selective learning
Although it is a good strategy to learn from rational, epistemically justified, cues regarding
speaker trustworthiness (e.g., preferring speakers who have demonstrated prior accuracy
in a relevant domain over those who have demonstrated inaccuracy), children have also
been shown to place trust in informants on the basis of cues that are not justified on
epistemic grounds. For instance, Bascandziev and Harris (2014) show that children
prefer information from an attractive informant over information from an unattractive
one. Similarly, Jaffer and Ma (2015) demonstrate that four- and five-year-old children
have a bias against physically disabled or obese people. This learning behaviour is not
rational in the sense that there is no epistemically grounded reason to assume that
attractiveness, physical ability, and obesity are relevant cues in a selective learning
situation. Jaffer and Ma suggest that failure to learn from these individuals might be
due to a general negativity bias, which would cause children to avoid (learning from) a
negative environment. Alternatively, it might be the case that attractive, able-bodied, or
non-obese individuals are associated with a positive bias, a ‘halo-effect’, according to
which they are associated with positive learning experiences regardless of their actual
trustworthiness. It has been shown that both adults and children are influenced by the
halo-effect in trait attribution (see Wilson and Eckel, 2006, for adults, and Cain,
Heyman, and Walker, 1997, for children). Although adults might be expected to
consider rational cues to be of greater importance than emotional cues in their
trustworthiness judgements, it is not clear whether this is also the case for children.
Will epistemically justified, rational cues indeed override these kinds of non-rational
biases in the word learning domain or will children consider the two types of cues to
be of equal importance? The current study seeks to further investigate this issue and
determine which cues children use in selective learning, and how rational and
non-rational, emotional, cues are weighted in the domain of word learning.
Speaker competence and benevolence cues in word learning
Two types of cues are the focus of the current study: A rational cue pertaining to a
speaker’s competence in providing accurate information in the linguistic domain, and a
non-rational, emotional, cue pertaining to a speaker’s level of benevolence (cf. Mascaro
and Sperber, 2009, for more on the competence and benevolence dimensions).
Previous studies have suggested that linguistic competence, which constitutes a rational
cue in the domain of word learning, is taken into account by children in the word
learning process, as they preferentially learn novel labels from previously accurate
speakers over inaccurate ones (see Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Koenig, Clément,
& Harris, 2004; Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007). Furthermore, Scofield
and Behrend (2008) showed that four-year-olds were even able to revise a label–object
link when the informant later proved to be an unreliable labeller. Sobel and Macris
(2013) added to this research by demonstrating that a speaker who displays good
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syntactic ability (labelling an object using correct syntax) is also preferred over a speaker
who displays poor syntactic ability (labelling an object using incorrect syntax: “This are a
ball”). Both lexical and syntactic accuracy thus seem to be linguistic competence cues that
children rely on in learning new object labels from others.
Children also appear to be attuned to more subtle linguistic competence cues, such
as linguistically conveyed certainty in labelling a novel object (cf. Bergstra, De Mulder,
& Coopmans, 2013; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001; Sabbagh, Wdowiak, & Ottaway, 2003).
Children prefer to follow the labelling of a speaker who claims to be familiar with an
object and to KNOW what it is called over the labelling of a speaker who states that he
isn’t familiar with an object and only THINKS a novel object has a particular label.
Although younger children do understand direct physical cues to an interlocutor’s
knowledge states better than these more indirect verbal cues of knowledge (Saylor &
Carroll, 2009), children of four years and older are generally capable of
understanding the distinction between mental state terms like know and think (cf.
Moore, Bryant, and Furrow, 1989, Moore and Davidge, 1989, for studies on mental
state term understanding in English, and De Mulder, 2015, for Dutch) and they thus
can and do use these cues in novel word learning. Although linguistically conveyed
speaker certainty may be a more indirect cue than prior naming accuracy, it is
clearly still a cue that is informative regarding a speaker’s labelling competence. In
this sense, then, it can be considered a rational cue: it is justifiable on epistemic
grounds to follow the labelling of a speaker who says he is certain about an object
name rather than the labelling of a speaker who makes it explicit that he is uncertain.
It has been shown, however, that children are also attuned to even more indirect
speaker competence cues, such as native accent (Corriveau, Kinzler, & Harris, 2013)
and speaker age (Jaswal & Neely, 2006). That is, children prefer to learn words from
speakers with a native accent over those with a non-native accent and from adults
over children. Although the epistemic grounds for these preferences in the domain of
word learning are somewhat less clear than for prior accuracy and speaker certainty,
it is still rational to follow the labelling of native speakers and adults in the domain
of novel word learning. After all, native speakers (as compared to non-native
speakers) and adults (as compared to children) are very likely to have a broader
vocabulary and thus are more likely to be able to offer the correct label.
Aside from relying on these epistemically justified, rational cues, previous studies have
also suggested that emotional cues such as speaker benevolence may influence children’s
preferential learning, although few studies have considered this factor specifically in a
word learning paradigm. For instance, Mascaro and Sperber (2009) demonstrated that
children as young as three are already more inclined to trust the testimony of nice
over nasty informants, preferring to follow a nice informant’s testimony regarding the
content of an opaque box rather than that of a nasty informant. Vanderbilt, Liu, and
Heyman (2011) demonstrate in a selective trust paradigm that five-year-olds prefer to
take advice from a helpful informant rather than from a deceitful informant in their
attempts to locate a hidden sticker. Benevolent speakers thus seem to be trusted more
by children than malevolent speakers in a general sense, but there is also evidence to
suggest that speaker morality may guide children’s novel word learning. Doebel and
Koenig (2013) found that children were more inclined to acquire novel labels from
well-intentioned speakers (who had previously been seen to engage in prosocial
behaviour towards peers) over those of a neutral speaker, and the labels of a neutral
speaker over those of an ill-intentioned speaker (who had previously displayed
antisocial behaviour towards peers). Similarly, Landrum, Mills, and Johnston (2013)
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showed that the labels of informants who were described as being prosocial (“This person
is very nice. He shares things, he gives presents to his friends and family, and he really
cares about other people’s feelings.”) were taken to be accurate by three- to
five-year-old children, even if they were said not to be experts in a particular labelling
domain. Prosocial, morally high-standing speakers thus seem to benefit from the
halo-effect: their positive social behaviour leads to attribution of knowledge in the
labelling domain, even though on epistemic grounds there is no clear reason to believe
that they would be more accurate labellers than speakers who have behaved antisocially
or neutrally. In this sense, then, speaker benevolence can be considered to be a
non-rational, emotional cue (Sobel & Kushnir, 2013).
The current study
Previous research has thus shown that children are sensitive to rational and emotional
cues if they are faced with conflicting information regarding the correct label for an
object. The current study aims to build on this previous work and extend it not only
by considering additional speaker features that may influence children’s willingness
to acquire novel vocabulary items (Experiment 1), but also by investigating how
children’s selective learning is influenced if multiple cue types interact (Experiment
2). To this end, Experiment 1 considers independent effects of speaker benevolence
and speaker certainty on children’s selective word learning. As previous studies have
found children to follow certain speakers over uncertain speakers (e.g., Bergstra
et al., 2013; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001), we expected a similar outcome for this study.
The speaker certainty cue thus served primarily as a replication of previous studies
and as a validation of the particular version of the paradigm used in this study. In
this way, the effects of speaker benevolence in the word learning domain could be
more clearly assessed. As the review of previous studies above makes clear, children
are more inclined to trust nice over nasty speakers in a general sense, and the novel
labels of morally high-standing speakers are also taken to be accurate. However,
previous studies have not considered whether the child’s PERSONAL liking of the
speaker in and of itself affects word learning (both previous studies in this domain
presented children with individuals who were said or shown to behave prosocially
towards OTHERS, and Landrum et al., 2013, did not consider the effects of speaker
benevolence independently from level of expertise). Investigating this specific factor
can thus make clear whether it is enough for a child to just like the speaker (based
on the speaker being nice to the child on one occasion) in order to be the recipient
of selective trust for word learning. Alternatively, evidence of a speaker’s moral
high-standing may have to be more pronounced and/or benevolence cues may have
to be coupled with other cues indicating potential labelling competence for
benevolent speakers to be preferred in the word learning domain.
Based on the outcomes of previous studies, in Experiment 1 we expect children to
have a preference for the object of the more positive informant: the certain speaker
over the uncertain speaker in the case of differences in speaker certainty, and the
nice speaker over the nasty speaker in the case of differences in speaker benevolence.
Experiment 2 then goes on to examine the weighting that children apply to these
different cues by combining high or low speaker certainty (a rational cue) and
benevolence or malevolence (an emotional cue) in one speaker. As relatively few studies
have combined different cues, it is harder to offer specific predictions for Experiment
2. However, what we do know from prior research is that prior naming accuracy, which
is a rational cue, tends to trump other (emotional or more subtle rational) cues.
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Native-accented speakers, for instance, were not preferred over foreign-accented speakers
if, previously, the native speaker displayed naming inaccuracy whilst the foreign speaker
was accurate (Corriveau et al., 2013). Similarly, adults’ labels are not preferred over the
labels provided by a child if the adult previously was inaccurate and the child accurate
(Jaswal & Neely, 2006). Corriveau and Harris (2009) show that accuracy is also more
important than familiarity. Four- and five-year-old children prefer the labels of a
familiar teacher over those of an unfamiliar teacher. However, when the unfamiliar
teacher provides accurate labels prior to the experiment phase, and the familiar teacher
provides inaccurate labels, the labels of the unfamiliar teacher are preferred. Prior
accuracy thus seems to be more important than age, accent, and familiarity, which
suggests that this clearly rational cue overrides other more subtle rational or emotional
cues. In the light of these results, we might thus expect the rational speaker certainty
cue to override the emotional benevolence cue.
However, not all studies find evidence for clearly rational cues prevailing over
non-rational ones. Bascandziev and Harris (2016), for example, found that children’s
preference for learning from attractive over unattractive speakers was not overridden
when the unattractive speaker was shown to be accurate and the attractive speaker
inaccurate. Furthermore, Landrum et al. (2013) demonstrated that children prefer the
labels of a benevolent informant over those of an expert informant. That is,
informants who were described as being prosocial individuals were trusted more than
informants who were described as being experts in a relevant area (for example, an
eagle expert when bird-related objects were being named). Indeed, this preference for
the prosocial speaker remained even when this speaker had irrelevant expertise (e.g.,
the prosocial speaker was described as an eagle expert in a situation in which vehicles
were being named). However, the level of preference for the prosocial and relevant
expert was higher than for the prosocial and irrelevant expert, indicating that children
were taking expertise into account to some extent. This suggests that cues related to a
speaker’s linguistic competence may be less relevant and/or salient to children in their
learning of novel labels than general benevolence cues. If this is the case in a broader
sense, we would expect to find that children will choose the labels of nice speakers
over those of certain speakers (i.e., the emotional benevolence cue will override the
rational speaker certainty cue).
Retention of labels in the selective word learning paradigm
Aside from investigating what kinds of information children take on board in
determining selective trust, and how different kinds of cues are weighted in this
process, an additional aim of the current study was to determine to what extent the
label–object links that the children learn during selective word learning trials are
enduring. After all, in this paradigm, children might just stick with the accurate person
without storing the new label in their lexicon (Birch et al., 2008), and thus not actually
learn any new words in the process. Given that by far the most of the previous studies
that have used the selective trust word learning paradigm have not assessed memory
for the novel label–object pairing after initial exposure, it is currently not entirely clear
whether children retain the label for a novel object over time. Sobel, Sedivy, Buchanan,
and Hennessy (2012) demonstrated that children do still remember the label provided
by a reliable speaker at the end of an experimental session, and Sabbagh and Shafman
(2009) showed that labels of unreliable speakers were not remembered in this time
frame, so there is some suggestion that word learning from reliable speakers does
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occur. However, neither of these studies assessed whether children remembered label–
object links after a greater time delay (i.e., beyond the experimental session during
which first exposure occurred), so it is not known to what extent novel labels are
retained in memory for a greater time period. Since creating an enduring link between
an object and a label is an important part of word learning, the current study not only
reassessed children’s novel object–label pairings at the end of the initial test session,
but also again during a second test session that was scheduled approximately a week
after the initial exposure to the novel label–object combinations. In this way, then, the
current study also aimed to shed light on whether word learning actually occurs in
selective trust word learning paradigms.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 assessed the independent effects of speaker certainty and benevolence in a
selective trust word learning paradigm and considered children’s memory of these novel
label–object pairings. In order to ensure that none of the participating children had
intrinsic problems in acquiring vocabulary items, a standardised receptive vocabulary
task was also included (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test–III-NL; Schlichting, 2005).
This test was used to exclude children with very low receptive vocabulary scores (i.e.,
scores⩽ 70) from analysis.
Method
Participants
Thirty-two Dutch children participated in this study, but one child was excluded given a
low score on the receptive vocabulary measure. This left 31 children (15 boys) between
four and six years old (M = 5;3) for analysis.
Children were recruited from three different classes of one elementary school in De
Bilt in the Netherlands. No formal data were collected regarding the socioeconomic
status and the race/ethnicity of the participants, but the majority of the children in
the sample were white and, given the socioeconomic characteristics of the school
neighbourhood, the children attending the school were most likely to come from a
lower-middle-class or middle-class background.
Procedure
Each child was tested in a separate room in the school. All children participated in two
sessions, each lasting around 20 minutes and separated by approximately one week. One
adult (the experimenter) was present in both sessions. The first session consisted of a
selective word learning paradigm in which two speakers (hand puppets) used novel
labels to describe various objects. At the end of the first session, children’s ability to
remember the novel label–object pairing was assessed in the first set of retention
trials. In the second session, children were administered the second set of retention
trials and their general Dutch receptive vocabulary was measured. After the
experiment, the children were rewarded with stickers.
Materials and design
Selective word learning. At the start of the experiment, children were introduced to two
puppets: Groentje (Greeny) and Blauwtje (Bluey), two identical monkeys, one with a
green scarf and one with a blue scarf, and told that these puppets would provide
names for various objects. For each trial, the puppets had one different object in
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front of them which they named using the same label. The child then had to decide to
which of the two objects that particular label referred by pointing to one of them. In the
practice phase, children received four trials consisting of known objects and labels to
familiarise them with the task. While the experimenter was present, both puppets
were seated next to each other, facing the child. Each puppet had a different familiar
object in front of him and labelled this with the same familiar label (e.g., Dit is een
bal. ‘This is a ball.’, which was an accurate labelling event for one of the puppets, but
inaccurate for the other). Each puppet used the correct label for their object on half
of the practice trials (i.e., each puppet engaged in two correct and two incorrect
labelling events). The practice phase thus familiarised children with the task, but did
not differentiate between the puppets’ levels of reliability. After the puppets had
labelled their objects on each trial, they disappeared, but the objects remained in the
same place. The experimenter asked the child to point at the object to which the
label referred, by asking: Welke was de X? ‘Which one was the X?’. All children
performed correctly on each of these practice items (a score of 100%), so all data
from the experimental trials were retained for further analysis.
In the test phase, both puppets had a novel object in front of them (16 novel objects
were created for this study) and the puppets used one of eight novel labels to refer to the
objects. The eight novel labels used in this study were: Mit, klek, teg, glap, wop, prok, raf,
and brim. Each of these words is a non-existent but phonotactically possible word in
Dutch. After having labelled their objects, the puppets disappeared, but the
experimenter remained visible during the entire experiment. The objects remained in
the same place and the experimenter asked: Welke was de X? ‘Which one was the X?’
The children were then required to point to one of the objects. If they did not respond,
the experimenter repeated the question, after which all of the children responded.
Children were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: the speaker
certainty condition (16 children) and the speaker benevolence condition (15 children),
consisting of eight trials each.
In the speaker certainty condition, the puppets displayed certainty or uncertainty in
their naming of the novel object. Level of speaker certainty was expressed by statements
concerning the puppet’s familiarity with the object and use of the mental state verb
know or think. Certainty statements like: Ik heb dit al eerder gezien. Kijk, dit is hoe je
het oppakt. ‘I have seen this before. Look, this is how you pick it up.’, which the
puppet said while picking up the object; and Ik heb hier vaak mee gespeeld, want ik
heb het thuis ook. Ik weet dat dit een mit is. ‘I have played with this a lot, because I
have it at home, too. I know this is a mit.’, were thus contrasted with statements
indicating uncertainty: Ik heb dit nog nooit gezien. Ik weet niet hoe je het op moet
pakken. ‘I have never seen this before. I don’t know how to pick it up.’, which the
puppet said while touching, but not lifting the object; and Ik heb hier nog nooit mee
gespeeld, want ik heb het thuis niet. Ik denk dat dit een mit is. ‘I have never played
with this, because I don’t have it at home. I think this is a mit.’ Each puppet was
certain in four test trials and uncertain in the four remaining trials. Each puppet
appeared on the left side (from the child’s point of view) four times and on the right
side four times. After each labelling event, the experimenter asked: Welke is de [novel
label]? ‘Which one is the [novel label]?’, and the children had to point to one of the
objects. If the children did not answer, the question was repeated, after which all of
the children responded.
The set-up of the speaker benevolence condition was similar to the speaker certainty
condition, except that the statements consisted of simple declarative sentences (both
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puppets uttered Dit is een mit ‘This is a mit’ and pointed at the object in front of them)
and that prior to the test phase the puppets had displayed nice or nasty behaviour
towards the child. Nice and nasty behaviour was operationalised as follows: at the
beginning of the test phase both puppets received stickers, whilst the child did not
receive any. One puppet then offered to share his stickers with the child whilst the
other expressed joy at the child not having any stickers. The nice puppet then
proceeded to give the child some stickers. Which of the two puppets was the nice
puppet was counterbalanced across participants. After the eight test trials, the child
was asked which puppet she considered to be nicer to ensure that the benevolence
manipulation had been successful.
In each experimental condition, two different testing orders were used and the order
in which the puppets spoke was counterbalanced. Furthermore, after four trials and
after eight trials, the four novel labels used in the previous trials were repeated by the
experimenter (e.g., Nu hebben we een mit, een klek, een teg en een glap gezien. ‘Now
we have seen a mit, a klek, a teg and a glap’), so that the child heard each label twice
during the first session.
Retention trials. Eight retention trials were administered twice: once at the end of the
first session and once in the second session, approximately one week later. In the
retention trials the experimenter showed the child the same eight pairs of novel
objects, one pair at a time, that the child had been exposed to initially. For each set
of two, the child was then asked: Welke was de [novel label]? ‘Which one was the
[novel label]?’. The child’s choice was considered correct if she gave the same answer
that she had provided initially. If a child didn’t answer, the question was repeated,
after which all of the children responded. There was no specific protocol for the
experimenter regarding the side on which the objects had to be placed; objects could
thus be placed on the same side as they had previously been placed or on the other side.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the participants in both conditions. We
expected the children to choose the object of the positive informant in both
conditions (i.e., the certain speaker and the nice speaker). The data was analysed by
means of a mixed-effects logistic regression model, with ‘positive informant’ as a
binomial dependent variable. The model included two crossed random effects,
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations (SD,) and Ranges for Participants in Experiment 1 (N = 31)
Mean SD Range
Age (months) 63 7.89 48–77
Speaker certaintya 6.25 1.69 4–8
Speaker benevolenceb 4.47 1.73 1–8
Retention trials session 1 6.77 1.09 4–8
Retention trials session 2 5.58 1.36 3–8
Note. a = score denotes the number of times the child followed the naming behaviour of the certain speaker; b = score
denotes the number of times the child followed the naming behaviour of the nice speaker; maximum score is 8 for all
variables except age.
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‘participant’ (the effect of the particular child that participated) and ‘trial’ (the effect of
the trial, whether it was the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, or final trial
for the child), and a fixed effect of ‘condition’ (the effect of whether the child
participated in the speaker certainty or in the speaker benevolence condition). The
model was fitted without an intercept for ‘condition’ in order to draw conclusions
about differences between participants’ choice of positive vs. negative informants per
experiment. There was a significant effect of condition (F(2,246) = 8.22, p < .001). For
children in the speaker certainty condition, the odds of choosing the positive
informant (in this case the certain speaker) were 3.66 times the odds of choosing the
object of the negative (uncertain) informant (which corresponds to a medium effect
size; see Chen, Cohen, & Chen, 2010) (β = 1.30, p < .001). For children in the speaker
benevolence condition, the odds of choosing the object of the positive speaker (in
this case the nice speaker) were only 1.30 times the odds of choosing the object of
the negative (nasty) informant, (β = 0.26, p = .40). Although both odds ratios (OR)
are higher than 1 (and thus suggest that there is a preference for both the certain
and the nice speaker), the result was only significant with regard to the preference
for the certain speaker. These findings thus suggest that, although children do prefer
to follow the naming behaviour of a certain over an uncertain speaker, children do
not preferentially follow the naming behaviour of a nice over a nasty speaker.
Since age effects were not of primary relevance in this study, we considered the
children as one group. However, in order to make sure that age did not play a
primary role in the results, we recreated the mixed-effects logistics regression model
mentioned above, but this time with the fixed effect ‘age in months’. The results
showed that age was not a significant factor (F(1,246) = 0.16, p = .69, OR = 0.99,
β = –0.01). In a model in which both ‘condition’ and ‘age in months’ were included
as a fixed effect, the results showed a very similar pattern. There was a significant
effect of condition (F(1,245) = 6.10, p = .01, OR = 2.93, β = 1.07), but age was not a
significant factor (F(1,245) = 0.43, p = .52, OR = 0.98, β = –0.02). Given these results,
age was not considered as a factor in further analyses in this study.
It should be noted that three of the 15 children in the speaker benevolence condition
did not consider the sticker-sharing puppet to be nicer than the non-sharing puppet
when they were asked who they thought was nicer. We repeated the analysis after
excluding these three children and it turned out that ‘condition’ (speaker certainty
vs. benevolence) remained statistically significant (F(1,246) = 6.02, p = .02, OR = 2.83,
β = 1.04).
To determine whether the label–object links would endure beyond the experimental
trial, performance on the retention trials at the end of session 1 and in session 2 was
considered. In the session 1 retention trials, children made the same label–object pairing
as they had done earlier on average in 6.77 out of 8 trials. A one-sample t-test
demonstrated that this was significantly above chance level (which would have been 4;
t(30) = 14.22, p < .001, d = 2.55). In the session 2 retention trials, the children chose the
same object as before in 5.58 out of 8 trials, which was also significantly above chance
level (t(30) = 6.47, p < .001, d = 1.16), but significantly less often than they had in session
1 (t(30) = 4.67, p < .001, d = 0.84). If performance on the retention trials is considered
separately for each condition, the same pattern of results emerges. That is, in both
conditions children chose the same object as they had before at significantly higher than
chance levels, both immediately after the experiment and a week later. Given that the
novel label–object link endured for at least a week after the first exposure, the results for
the retention trials suggest that word learning does occur in this paradigm.
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Experiment 1 thus demonstrates that children create enduring label–object links in a
selective learning paradigm, and that, although they prefer certain speakers over
uncertain speakers, the label–object pairings of nice speakers are not preferred over
those of nasty speakers. Whereas the finding regarding speaker certainty was
expected, the finding for speaker benevolence was somewhat surprising. After all,
Doebel and Koenig (2013) had demonstrated that a speaker who displayed
well-intentioned, helpful behaviour towards a peer was considered to be reliable in
his object labelling. Moreover, Landrum et al. (2013) showed that benevolence was
even a more important factor than expertise. Although previous studies thus suggest
that benevolence is a primary feature that children rely on in learning novel labels,
the current study did not find support for this position. Behaving nicely towards the
child on one occasion at the beginning of the test trials did not seem to be enough
for the child to display trust in a speaker’s testimony.
Experiment 2
Whereas Experiment 1 considered speaker certainty and benevolence independently,
Experiment 2 investigated the combination of these characteristics in one speaker
and aimed to answer the question whether children’s preference for certain speakers’




Fifty-two Dutch children participated in Experiment 2. However, three children could
not be tested again in session 2 and one child had an extremely low receptive vocabulary
score. These four children were excluded from analysis, leaving 48 children (23 boys)
between four and six years old (M = 5;5) for analysis.
Children were recruited from four different classes of two elementary schools in the
Netherlands (in De Bilt and Nijmegen) and came from a similar background as the
children in Experiment 1. None of the children in Experiment 2 had participated in
Experiment 1.
Procedure, materials, and design
The procedure, materials, and design of Experiment 2 were very similar to that of
Experiment 1. As the practice phase, the speaker benevolence manipulation, and the
retention trials were identical to those of Experiment 1, only the test phase of the
selective word learning task is described here.
Selective word learning. Prior to the test phase, children went through a practice phase
and their liking of the speakers was manipulated (see Experiment 1). In the test phase
each child was presented with 12 trials, in which both the nice and the nasty puppet
named an unfamiliar object using statements that indicated their level of certainty
(“I have seen this before. I play with it often, because I have it at home. I know this
is a mit.” vs. “I have not seen this before. I have never played with this, because
I don’t have it at home. I think this is a mit.”). The twelve novel labels used in this
study were: mit, klek, teg, glap, wop, prok, raf, and brim, as in Experiment 1, plus
four additional words: hast, virg, tork, and nelf. Each of these words is a non-existent
but phonotactically possible word in Dutch.
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For each individual child, speaker benevolence was held constant (i.e., either Bluey or
Greeny was nice), but speaker certainty varied by trial (on half of the trials Bluey was
certain, on the other half Greeny was). This experimental design was chosen as it is
plausible for a puppet to be certain on one trial but uncertain on the next, whereas
this is not the case for benevolence. That is, if the puppets had changed their
behaviour towards the child on each trial (with one puppet kindly sharing stickers
one moment but expressing joy that the child had not received any stickers on the
next trial), they could not really be considered to be truly nice or nasty in nature.
This combination of speaker certainty and benevolence characteristics led to two
different kinds of trials. In half of the trials, a nice and uncertain puppet was
contrasted with a nasty and certain puppet (certainty VS. benevolence trials).
Comparison of these trials could demonstrate whether children preferentially trust
certain speakers, even if they are nasty. In the other six trials, a nice and certain
puppet was contrasted with a nasty and uncertain puppet (certainty PLUS benevolence
trials). A comparison of the two types of trials (certainty VS. benevolence and
certainty PLUS benevolence) can demonstrate whether the child will prefer the
labelling of a nice and certain puppet over that of a nasty and certain puppet (i.e., if
she follows the labelling of the certain puppet more often in the certainty PLUS
benevolence trials than in the certainty VS. benevolence trials). This comparison is
thus informative in order to determine whether benevolence influences the child’s
selective learning if the level of speaker certainty is made explicit, but does not
distinguish the speakers.
Table 2 shows a summary of the trial types (note that the two trial types were mixed
and the order in which the two puppets spoke was counterbalanced).
Results and Discussion
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for Experiment 2. What we investigate in
Experiment 2 is, first, whether the testimony of a nice and uncertain puppet will be
preferred over the testimony of a nasty and certain puppet (based on the certainty
VS. benevolence trials). This comparison demonstrates which of the two cues,
benevolence or certainty, children consider to be more important. Second, we
considered whether there is a preference for the testimony of the nice and certain
speaker over that of the nasty and certain speaker (based on the outcomes of the
certainty VS. benevolence trials as compared to the certainty PLUS benevolence trials).
This latter part of the investigation thus entails that information is compared across
different trial types. We can thus not obtain a ‘pure’ measure of children’s preference
for nice and certain over nasty and certain speakers, because children are faced with
different contrasts when they have to make their choice (see Table 2). This set-up
means that the data in Experiment 2 are structured differently to the data in
Experiment 1 and thereby preclude the use of the mixed models analysis that was
Table 2. Overview Selective Word Learning Trials Experiment 2
Trial type Puppet 1 Puppet 2
Certainty VS benevolence (6 trials) nice & uncertain nasty & certain
Certainty PLUS benevolence (6 trials) nice & certain nasty & uncertain
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applied to the data from Experiment 1 (Eddington, 2015). Therefore, paired samples
t-tests were used for the analysis of Experiment 2 instead.
The results of Experiment 2 showed that children followed the labelling of the nasty
and certain puppet more often than that of the nice and uncertain puppet (M = 4.21 vs.
M = 1.79), a difference that was statistically significant (t(47) = 5.16, p < .001, d = 0.74).
Excluding children who did not consider the nice puppet to be nicer does not change
this pattern of results. Note, though, that 21 out of 48 children did not consider the nice
puppet to be nicer, which is a surprisingly large number given that the benevolence
manipulation had been successful in 12 out of 15 children in Experiment 1. We will
return to this issue in the ‘General Discussion’, but for now we note that the fact
that the sticker sharing was a very short, single event and, as such, may not have
been enough for children to consider the puppet to be nice or nasty in general.
Speaker certainty was thus found to trump benevolence: even if a speaker is nasty to
the child prior to labelling, children still prefer to learn from them if they are certain
about their labelling.
However, benevolence may still play a role in selective word learning if certain and
nice speakers are preferred over certain and nasty speakers. The number of times a child
followed the testimony of a nice and certain puppet (from the certainty PLUS
benevolence trials) was thus compared with the number of times she followed a
nasty and certain puppet (from the certainty VS. benevolence trials). A paired
samples t-test demonstrated that the certain and nice puppet was followed
significantly more often than the certain and nasty puppet (M = 4.54 vs. M = 4.21,
t(47) = 2.37, p = .02, d = 0.34). If the level of explicitly marked speaker certainty is
equal, children thus do prefer to learn from a nice rather than a nasty speaker. This
interpretation is strengthened if the results of children who considered the nice
puppet to be nicer are considered independently from those of children who did not
like the nice puppet more. The 27 children who considered the sticker-sharing
puppet to be nicer followed the nice and certain puppet’s advice significantly more
often than they followed the advice of the certain and nasty puppet (M = 4.81 vs. M
= 4.41, t(26) = 2.66, p = .01, d = 0.51), whereas this was not the case for the 21
children who did not prefer the sticker-sharing puppet (M = 4.19 vs. M = 3.95, t(20)
= 0.93, p = .37, d = 0.20). This suggests that, if children like a particular speaker, they
follow that speaker’s labelling, but only if labelling certainty is also displayed explicitly.
In order to investigate children’s ability to remember the label–object pairings,
performance on the retention trials was also considered (see Table 3). In the session
Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations (SD) and Ranges for Participants in Experiment 2 (N = 48)
Mean SD Range
Age (months) 65 8.46 48–79
Certainty VS. benevolencea 4.21 1.62 0–6
Certainty PLUS benevolenceb 4.54 1.49 1–6
Remember trails session 1 9.88 1.77 6–12
Retention trials session 2 8.94 1.87 4–12
Note. a = score denotes the number of times the child followed the naming behaviour of the certain and nasty puppet,
maximum score = 6; b = score denotes the number of times the child followed the naming behaviour of the certain and
nice puppet, maximum score = 6; maximum score retention trials 1 and 2 = 12.
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1 retention trials, the children chose the same object as they had before in 9.88 out of 12
trials, which is significantly above chance level (which would have been 6) (t(47) =
15.17, p < .001, d = 2.19). In the session 2 retention trials, the children chose the
same object on 8.94 out of 12 trials, which was also significantly above chance
(t(47) = 10.87, p < .001, d = 1.57), but significantly lower than one week earlier (t(47) =
3.86, p < .001, d = 0.56). In line with the results of Experiment 1, this outcome thus
demonstrates that children remember many labels even after one week has passed,
lending support to the idea that children create lasting lexical–semantic representations
in this paradigm.
General Discussion
This study investigated how speaker certainty and speaker benevolence, both
independently and in combination, influence children’s willingness to acquire novel
labels in a selective trust word learning paradigm. In line with previous research
(Bergstra et al., 2013; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001; Sabbagh et al., 2003), speaker
certainty was taken to be a reliable cue, with children significantly preferring the
labelling of a certain speaker over that of an uncertain speaker. However, in contrast
with what was expected for speaker benevolence, given the findings by Doebel and
Koenig (2013) and Landrum et al. (2013) that children prefer to go with the
labelling of speakers who are described as being well intentioned, this study did not
find speaker benevolence to play an independent role in selective word learning.
That is, children were not more inclined to learn a novel label–object pairing from a
speaker who previously had behaved nicely towards them than from a speaker who
had behaved nastily. Furthermore, when children had to choose between, on the one
hand, the labelling of a nice and uncertain speaker and, on the other, a nasty and
certain speaker, the speaker certainty cue trumped the speaker benevolence cue.
Children thus preferred the labelling of the certain speaker, even if this speaker had
behaved nastily to them at the beginning of the experiment.
These findings thus suggest that speaker certainty, as a rational cue in the word
learning domain, trumped the emotional speaker benevolence cue. Interestingly
though, speaker benevolence is not wholly disregarded by the child, as children were
found to prefer the labelling of a nice speaker over that of a nasty speaker if they
both expressed certainty about their labelling. Children thus go with the certain
speaker regardless of benevolence, but they do prefer nice and certain speakers over
nasty and certain speakers. We can assume, then, that children do show a preference
towards nice speakers to some extent, but that, by itself, this cue was not strong
enough to guide them.
Given that previous studies have found emotional cues to be strong enough to
influence selective learning (with children preferentially learning from attractive,
physically able, non-obese individuals, as in Bascandziev and Harris, 2014, 2016, and
Jaffer and Ma, 2015), our findings raise the question why speaker benevolence did
not have a stronger effect on children’s word learning. Perhaps the benevolence
manipulation in our experiments was not strong enough for it to be a sufficient cue
to go on by itself. We assumed that children would think well of a speaker who
shared stickers with her and badly of a speaker who refused to do so, but it may be
the case that children just don’t consider a failure to share stickers with others as
particularly unkind behaviour. They may not be inclined to share their own stickers
with others either and thus may not consider lack of sticker sharing to be
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particularly unreasonable. Evidence in favour of this idea comes from Experiment
2. Even though 12 out of 15 participants considered the sticker-sharing puppet to be
the nicer puppet in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 only 27 out of the 48 children
said they liked the sticker-sharing puppet more. The sticker-sharing memory thus
seems to have still been present at the end of Experiment 1 (allowing children to
correctly identify the nicer speaker, even though the act of sticker sharing may not
have evoked enough goodwill to actually influence selective trust), but may have
waned for many children by the end of Experiment 2, which was both longer and
more complex (consisting of more trials and requiring more bits of information to
be processed) than Experiment 1.
Furthermore, for our benevolence manipulation to be effective, the child has to
remember the sticker-sharing event explicitly, whereas this was not a requirement for
other studies that have shown the influence of emotional cues (factors like a
speaker’s attractiveness, and level of obesity are constantly visible to the child and do
not rely on memory). Given that the benevolence cue thus had to be explicitly
remembered on the basis of information provided only at the beginning of the
experiment, whereas the speaker certainty information was provided in each trial, the
benevolence cue may just not have been strong enough or active enough for it to
influence the child’s labelling choices. At any rate, in future research a more salient
means of manipulating speaker benevolence or a paradigm in which the benevolence
information is cued in each trial should be considered. With a stronger
manipulation, benevolence may turn out to be a more important factor in selective
learning than the outcome of this study suggests.
Although this caveat should thus be kept in mind, the results of the current study
suggest that children give more weight to cues pertaining to speaker competence
(speaker certainty) than to cues pertaining to speaker benevolence. Children thus
seem to prefer the rational speaker competence cue over the emotional benevolence
cue. Although some previous studies have found the opposite pattern (Landrum
et al., 2013), it should be noted that this would seem to be the more optimal strategy
in learning novel words, at least as regards these specific instantiations of rational vs.
emotional cues. After all, speakers who express certainty provide explicit information
regarding their convictions about their labelling accuracy. The child may or may not
believe these convictions to be accurate, but at least these speakers are being explicit
about the likelihood with which they consider their labels to be correct. The nice
speakers, on the other hand, did not provide any specific information in this respect.
The only thing the child had to go on in these cases was an epistemically unfounded
bias towards nice speakers. This might be enough for children if the benevolence
manipulation is strong, but if it is relatively weak, as it seemed to be in the current
study, benevolence cues may be largely ignored in favour of speaker competence cues.
However, what the findings of the current study do not make clear is the extent to
which children have an explicit understanding of the different epistemic status of
rational vs. emotional cues. That is, the current study cannot determine whether
children preferentially learn from certain speakers over nice speakers because they
realise that speaker certainty is in principle a more reliable cue than benevolence in
the domain of word learning, or whether certainty was simply a more salient cue
than benevolence in the set-up of the current study (see also Heyes, 2017, for a
similar argument relating to developmental studies investigating selective trust). It
should also be noted that, in theory at least, it is not even necessarily clear that the
emotional cue used here is not based on some kind of rational thought process. That
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is, although there are no clear epistemic grounds on which to assume that nice speakers
are more likely to know what a particular novel object is called as compared to nasty
speakers, one could come to prefer the nice speaker’s label–object pairing on the
basis of reasoning. The child may assume that a nice speaker is less likely to wilfully
mislead her by providing a label that they know to be incorrect (although they may
be incorrect for other reasons). This would thus entail that the chances of learning
the correct label may well be higher if the nice speaker is preferred over the nasty
one. The results of the current study do not suggest that this is what is happening,
as children do not prefer the label–object pairings of the nice speaker over those of
the nasty speaker, even if that is the only information they have to go on. However,
future studies that do find clearer evidence for reliance on emotional cues should
investigate whether this is based on an epistemically unjustified halo-effect or on
some form of rational reasoning.
In addition to investigating children’s selective trust, this study also aimed to
determine whether the label–object links that the children learn in these sort of
experiments are enduring. Do children actually store these novel label–object pairings
in their lexicon or are these pairings forgotten immediately after their first exposure?
While Sabbagh and Shafman (2009) showed that children do not learn words from
ignorant speakers, our study showed that once children have created a label–object link
this does endure for at least a week, regardless of the particular characteristics of the
speakers who were guiding them. That is, in Experiment 1 children retained their
initial label–object link for a week even when the only information they were provided
with came from nice vs. nasty speakers, a cue that, in itself, did not influence
children’s choices. The outcomes of this study therefore suggest that children do retain
label–object links in this paradigm, as for both experiments children remembered
which object they had paired a particular novel label with a week earlier, but they do
this even if they are not clearly placing their trust in one specific speaker. Once
children have decided on a specific label–object pairing, they thus stick with it for at
least a week, even if they have no clear assurances that this pairing is indeed correct.
In conclusion then, this study demonstrates that enduring label–object links are
made in selective trust word learning paradigms and that children preferentially
learn from certain speakers over uncertain speakers. Speaker benevolence, on the
other hand, has a more subtle role to play in word learning: in itself it is not used as
a word learning cue, but it can flip the balance in favour of one speaker over another
if combined with rational cues to labelling accuracy.
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